A Court of Appeal judge, Justice Okong Abang, has declared that joint appeals in criminal matters constitute an incurable irregularity, one that no ingenuity of counsel can salvage in law.
He made the declaration in a judgment marked by industry, clarity, and fearless candour.
Justice Abang delivered the decision in an appeal jointly filed by Barrister Maxwell Opara and Barrister Gold Nwankwo against the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in Appeal No. CA/1634/2025 (Barrister Maxwell Opara & Anor v. FRN & Anor).
In firm and unmistakable terms, the court also cautioned against the creeping culture of media theatrics in litigation, noting pointedly that the courtroom is not a theatre for publicity, and that litigation is not a human rights spectacle driven by press releases.
The appellants had sought to overturn the decision of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, delivered on 16 October 2025 by Justice Muazu, which dismissed their applications requesting the trial judge’s recusal in an ongoing criminal proceeding.
Justice Abang, setting the tone for the judgment, first addressed the EFCC’s preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the court. He emphasised that the fate of the appeal rested squarely on that threshold issue.
According to him, once an objection to jurisdiction succeeds, the appeal cannot proceed to the merits, saying it must be struck out or dismissed, depending on the circumstances.
The court found that although the trial court delivered its ruling on 16 October 2025, the appellants remained inert for over 14 days, running afoul of clear constitutional and procedural timelines.
The court underscored that by virtue of Section 242(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Section 14(1) of the Court of Appeal Act, the appellants were required to seek and obtain leave to appeal within that prescribed period.
“However, by 30 October 2025, being the end of the 14-day prescribed period, the appellants suddenly woke from their slumber to file the appeal so as not to be statute-barred. My Lords, equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent,” the court held, in language as vivid as it was decisive.
On the issue of costs, the court observed that the appellants equally overlooked a settled principle: there is no automatic right of appeal on costs without prior leave, as required under Section 241(2)(c) of the Constitution.
Justice Abang described as fundamentally flawed the appellants’ decision to proceed with filing briefs in respect of an interlocutory decision without first securing leave.
“This is a condition precedent for the activation of the appellate jurisdiction of this court,” he stated, reaffirming the long-standing judicial position that failure to obtain such leave is not a procedural slip but a jurisdictional defect that vitiates the entire appeal.
The court was unequivocal in its condemnation of the appellants’ failure to obtain the mandatory leave from either the trial court or the appellate court.
“This failure is not only fatal but renders the Notice of Appeal fundamentally flawed and incompetent ab initio. Consequently, there is no valid appeal before the court,” Justice Abang declared.
On the second issue, the court delivered what may well become a defining pronouncement in Nigerian criminal appellate practice.
Agreeing with the EFCC, Justice Abang held that a joint notice of appeal in a criminal matter is wholly alien to the law.
“Put differently, there cannot be a joint Notice of Appeal in a criminal matter, even where the parties were jointly charged,” he ruled.
The court found that the appellants’non-compliance with Order 17 Rules 3(1) and 5(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules was no mere technical lapse but a fundamental breach with constitutional implications, one that rendered the appeal incurably defective from inception.
In a passage that resonates beyond the facts of the case, Justice Abang issued a stern admonition to legal practitioners.
“Appellate practice is not child’s play, nor is it human rights advocacy. Mandatory compliance with the Rules of Court is required. Where counsel is not properly grounded in appellate practice, he should not risk rushing to the Court of Appeal with a Notice of Appeal.”
In the end, the court found the appeal to be wholly incompetent and beyond redemption, describing it as a reckless abuse of judicial process.
Holding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter on the merits, the court struck out the appeal and awarded costs of N500,000 in favour of the first respondent, payable by the appellants.
This judgment does more than dispose of an appeal, it sharpens the foundational rule of criminal appellate procedure.
It stands as a clear and compelling reminder that the architecture of appellate justice rests on strict compliance with constitutional and procedural requirements, and that where those foundations are ignored, no appeal, however framed, can stand.